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Abstract 
 
This study explored whether individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience 
difficulties with action monitoring. Two experimental tasks examined whether adults with ASD are 
able to monitor their own actions online, and whether they also show a typical enactment effects in 
memory (enhanced memory for actions they have performed compared to actions they have 
observed being performed). Individuals with ASD and comparison participants showed a similar 
pattern of performance on both tasks. In a task which required individuals to distinguish person-
caused from computer-caused changes in phenomenology both groups found it easier to monitor 
their own actions compared to those of an experimenter. Both groups also showed typical 
enactment effects. Despite recent suggestions to the contrary, these results support suggestions that 
action monitoring is unimpaired in ASD.  
 
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder; Action monitoring; Enactment effect; Source 
memory; Self-referencing; Agency. 
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of behavioural 
impairments in social-communication, and by fixated interests and repetitive behaviours (e.g., 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). On the cognitive level, it has been suggested that ASD is 
characterised by diminished self-awareness (e.g., Hobson, 1990; Russell, 1996; Williams, 2010) 
and, more recently, that specific aspects of self-awareness are selectively diminished in this 
disorder. For example, it has been suggested that individuals with ASD have diminished awareness 
of psychological aspects of the self (e.g., awareness of one’s own thoughts, personality 
characteristics etc.), but undiminished awareness of physical aspects of self (e.g., awareness of one's 
own physical appearance; Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010). In keeping with this proposal, studies have 
shown that individuals with ASD  demonstrate difficulties representing and reporting their own 
thought processes (e.g., Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), intentions (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2010), 
emotional feelings (e.g., Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004) and beliefs (e.g., 
Williams & Happé, 2009b), all of which supports the suggestion that individuals with ASD show 
diminished psychological self-awareness. In contrast, several lines of evidence suggest that 
awareness of the physical self is relatively unimpaired in individuals with ASD. For example, 
individuals with ASD typically show undiminished performance on mirror self-recognition tasks 
(e.g., Ferrari & Matthews, 1983), delayed video self-recognition tasks (Lind & Bowler, 2009a), and 
action imitation tasks (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007).  
However, some researchers have queried whether awareness of physical aspects of self is 
truly undiminished in ASD, citing studies that apparently show diminished “action monitoring” in 
ASD (Russell & Jarrold, 1998, 1999). Russell and Hill (2001, p.317) define action monitoring as, 
“the mechanisms that ensure that agents know, without self-observation, (a) for which changes in 
perceptual input they are responsible and (b) what they are currently engaged in doing”. As such, 
action monitoring allows an individual to distinguish those changes in perceptual experience that 
are “self-caused” from those that are externally-caused.  Thus, action monitoring gives rise to the 
4 
 
experience of agency. If individuals with ASD do show impairments in action monitoring this 
contradicts theories that suggest awareness of the physical self is not impaired in ASD, despite 
limitations in awareness of psychological aspects of self (e.g., Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010).  
Action monitoring ability is commonly assessed through tasks that examine an individuals’ 
ability to monitor and correct their own errors. Typically, individuals are able to correct errors so 
rapidly that they cannot simply be relying on visual feedback alone. Instead correcting errors at this 
speed is thought to depend on monitoring so called ‘efference copies’ of motor plans. This enables 
errors to be corrected before a motor command for the particular action is initiated. Typically, error 
correction problems are found in individuals with schizophrenia (e.g., Frith & Done, 1989), and are 
normally interpreted as reflecting diminished action monitoring . Studies have also indicated that 
individuals with ASD show impairments in correcting errors (e.g., Russell & Jarrold, 1998). As 
such, this is one source of evidence that suggests action monition may be impaired in ASD. Another 
source of evidence, which has been taken as evidence that ASD involves diminished action 
monitoring ability, concerns findings from studies that have assessed relative memory for self-
performed actions versus memory for observed actions.  It is well established that typically 
developing individuals show reliably superior memory for actions that they themselves have 
performed, compared to actions that they have observed other people perform (e.g., Baker-Ward, 
Hess, & Flannagan, 1990; Engelkamp, 1998). Superior memory for self-performed actions over 
other-performed actions is referred to as the “enactment effect” and is thought to result from 
additional motoric components involved in performing an action leading to those actions being 
more deeply encoded than observed actions (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1989).  The fact that 
several studies have reported reduced or absent enactment effects in ASD has led to the suggestion 
that ASD may be characterised by diminished action monitoring (Farrant, Blades, & Boucher, 1998; 
Hala, Rasmussen, & Henderson, 2005; Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 2000; Russell & 
Jarrold, 1999; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011; Zalla et al., 2010). Indeed, some studies 
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have even reported reversed enactment effects (i.e., an “observer effect”; superior memory for 
observed actions compared to self-performed actions) in ASD, suggesting a marked atypicality in 
physical self-awareness in this disorder (Millward, et al., 2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999).  All of 
these studies have lead researchers to conclude “the reduced enactment effect in adults with AS 
reveals an impaired action monitoring system” (Zalla et al., 2010, p.6).  
However, in our view, there are grounds for questioning whether the results from these 
studies, and thus the conclusion that action monitoring is diminished in ASD, are indeed valid and 
reliable. In the studies by Farrant et al. (1998) and Hala et al. (2005), participants with ASD showed 
a flat profile of memory for self-performed and observed actions.  However, in both of these studies 
comparison participants did not show a significant enactment effect either.  Rather, they too showed 
a flat profile of performance and there were no significant between-group differences in this respect 
in either of the studies.  Therefore, the failure of individuals with ASD to show an enactment effect 
in these studies cannot be taken to support the view that action monitoring/physical self-awareness 
is diminished in this disorder. Instead, because typically developing individuals in these studies also 
failed to show enactment effects, the failure to find an enactment effect among participants with 
ASD is likely to be due to methodological issues associated with the procedure/stimuli used in the 
studies.  
In the study by Millward et al. (2000), comparison participants did show a significant 
enactment effect, whereas participants with ASD showed an atypical observer effect.  This does 
indicate that action monitoring may be impaired in individuals with ASD. However, one major 
problem with this study is that Millward et al. (2000) did not match ASD and comparison 
participants for VIQ.  Although the groups were matched for verbal mental age, the comparison 
group had a mean chronological age that was seven years below that of the ASD group.  Thus, as 
Lind (2010) highlights, participants with ASD had VIQ scores that were approximately 54 points 
below those of comparison participants.  In our view, it is simply not possible to compare 
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meaningfully the experimental task performance of ASD and comparison participants in Millward 
et al.’s study.  Matching for VIQ is essential in studies of cognitive function in individuals with 
ASD. It is possible that differences between groups in this respect can potentially entirely explain 
between-group differences in Millward et al.,’s experimental task (see Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 
2004).   
In an attempt to overcome this limitation, Millward et al. (2000) conducted a second study. 
This study assessed a sample of children with intellectual disability who, like the ASD group in 
their Study 1, had lower verbal mental ages than chronological ages. However, no ASD or typically 
developing comparison groups were included, and the group with intellectual disability in Study 2 
was not comparable to the ASD or typically developing groups from Study 1 in terms of either 
verbal mental age or chronological age. Furthermore, the group of children with intellectual 
disability in Study 2 experienced a different set of events in different locations to those used in 
Study 1. As such, in our view, it is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions from this 
study. In a more recent study Wojcik et al. (2011) also failed to find significant enactment effects 
among children with ASD. In contrast, on the same task typically developing children showed a 
clear enactment effect.  However, the study does not report whether groups were matched for verbal 
intelligence. In our view, as is the case with Millward et al. (2000) it thus remains unclear whether 
group differences in VIQ could potentially account for group differences in memory performance.   
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the studies by Farrant et al., (1998), Hala et al., 
(2005), Millward et al., (2000) and Wojcik et al., (2010) because of the methodological problems 
that are arguably inherent in the design of each study.  However, in our view, the studies by Russell 
and Jarrold (1999), and Zalla et al. (2010) both used sound experimental procedures. In both 
studies, individuals with ASD and comparison participants were closely matched for age and verbal 
intelligence, and comparison participants in each study did show significant enactment effects.  As 
such, if reliable, the findings of reduced/reversed enactment effects in ASD in these studies provide 
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a serious challenge to theories that action monitoring ability is typical in individuals with ASD. 
However, there is reason to question the reliability of the results reported by Russell and Jarrold. 
Using a slightly modified version of Russell and Jarrold’s original task, Williams and Happé 
(2009a) found that participants with ASD showed a typical enactment effect in a source memory 
task.  They did not observe significant differences between the (well-matched) groups of ASD and 
comparison participants, in this respect. This suggests that Russell & Jarrold’s findings (1999) may 
not be replicable (see discussion for a greater discussion).  
The fact that Williams & Happé (2009a) could not replicate the results of Russell and 
Jarrold (1999) highlights the importance of replicating methodologically rigorous studies with well-
designed methods. With this in mind, the current study represents an attempt to replicate, in our 
view, the only other methodologically rigorous study that has failed to find an enactment effect in 
ASD;  Zalla et al. (2010).  Zalla and colleagues explored whether adults with ASD would show an 
enactment effect when their memory was tested for actions they themselves had performed, 
compared to actions that they had observed someone else perform in a video clip.  Participants’ 
memory for performed and observed actions was tested using three memory tasks; a free recall task, 
a recognition task and a source memory task. Zalla et al. (2010) found that participants with ASD 
showed similar performance to control participants on the recognition and source memory tests, 
showing better memory for actions they had performed compared to actions they had observed 
being performed by someone else. However on the free recall task participants showed no 
significant difference in the proportion of enacted actions they recalled, compared to the proportion 
of observed actions they recalled. In contrast, control participants recalled significantly more 
actions that they had performed compared to those they had observed.  
As such, in order to provide clearer evidence of whether action monitoring abilities are 
diminished in ASD, the first experimental task reported in this paper attempted to replicate the 
findings of Zalla et al. In so doing, we aimed to test whether Zalla’s findings were reliable, or 
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whether, as was the case with Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) findings, they could not be replicated. If 
individuals with ASD do show impairments in their ability to monitor their own actions then you 
would expect to find a reduced or absent enactment effect on this task. However if, as predicted, 
action monitoring remains unimpaired in individuals with ASD, then performance on the task 
should be similar in both the TD and ASD participants.  
We also included, as a  second experimental task, a version of the “online” action 
monitoring task employed by Williams and Happé (2009a; Experiment 1). According to Russell 
(Russell & Jarrold, 1999), tasks which require individuals to discriminate online between their own 
actions and actions initiated by something/someone else provide a direct measure of action 
monitoring ability. Following Russell and Hill (2001), Williams and Happé employed a task that 
involved participants moving a computer mouse (which was placed inside a box, obscuring it from 
view) and were asked to decide which, from a number of moving coloured squares displayed on a 
computer screen, was the stimulus being controlled by their own hand movements. Success on the 
task relied on participants deciding which of the movements on the screen corresponded with their 
own proprioceptively experienced movements. The study also included a second ‘Other’ condition. 
In this condition participants placed their hand on the computer mouse, but the movements of the 
mouse were controlled by the experimenter. Thus, in this condition, participants experience no 
motor intentions for the movements of the mouse in the Other condition, and so cannot rely on 
feelings of agency to determine which of the stimuli is being controlled by the mouse. For an 
individual with a unimpaired sense of their own agency, this condition should be significantly more 
challenging than the Self condition. In contrast, if individuals are unable to accurately monitor their 
own actions then it should not matter who controls the mouse, because in both cases participants 
cannot rely on an experience of agency to perform the task, and instead can only rely on their ability 
to match felt actions with the observed consequences of these actions. Williams and Happé (2009a) 
did not observe any significant between-group difference in either the level or pattern of 
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performance shown by individuals with and without ASD on the task. Additionally, (when 
diagnostic groups were collapsed) Williams & Happé (2009a) found that performance on the self 
condition of the Squares task was significantly associated with source memory for self performed 
actions, independently of verbal mental age. The better participants’ action monitoring ability on 
the squares task the greater the enactment effect shown by participants on the memory task. Thus, 
Williams and Happé found a direct link between online action monitoring and the enactment effect.  
We included this squares task in our study to provide an additional measure of action monitoring 
ability to the measures used by Zalla et al., (2010). Including this test of action monitoring also 
allowed us to investigate whether action monitoring ability as assessed by an online measure relates 
to action monitoring ability assessed by the enactment effect. It was predicted that individuals with 
ASD would show similar performance on the Self condition of the task as comparison participants, 
and that both groups would find the Self condition considerably easier than the Other condition. It 
was also predicted that individuals’ action monitoring ability on both experimental tasks would be 
related. All predictions were in keeping with suggestions that, regardless of whether it is assessed 
online or via memory, action monitoring ability should be unimpaired in individuals with ASD.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham University ethics committee. 
Seventeen adults with ASD and 17 neurotypical comparison adults took part in this study, all of 
whom gave written informed consent before participating. Participants in the ASD group had all 
received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 4) or Asperger’s disorder (n = 13), according to 
conventional criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 1993). 
Participants with ASD were recruited via an advertisement on The National Autistic Society 
website; ASD support groups; Durham University Service for Students with Disabilities; and word 
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of mouth.  The majority of comparison participants were recruited through advertisements in local 
newspapers.  However, a small number took part in order to receive course credits in partial 
fulfilment of their undergraduate psychology degrees.   
Fifteen of the 17 participants in the ASD group were administered with the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). The ADOS is an in-depth 
observational assessment of ASD characteristics. Two participants did not wish to complete the 
ADOS, because they did not feel comfortable being filmed. The mean ADOS total score for the 
ASD group was in the autism range (see Table 1). All participants who completed the ADOS 
received a total score ≥7, above the defined cut-off for ASD (Lord, et al., 2000). Additionally, all 
participants in the ASD group completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-report questionnaire that assesses ASD 
characteristics. Fourteen out of 17 participants scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ 
(total score ≥26; Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). Three participants did not 
self-report a score above this cut-off. However, all three of these participants scored well above the 
defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all scored ≥12).  
All comparison participants completed the AQ and all scored below the defined cut-off for 
ASD. No participants, in either the ASD or TD group, reported using any psychotropic medication. 
Additionally, none of the participants reported a history of having a neurological or psychiatric 
condition (apart from ASD). The participant groups were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal 
ability, as assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). 
Groups were also closely matched for chronological age (see Table 1 for participant characteristics).  
 
Design and Procedure 
Enactment effect task. We attempted to replicate the procedure for the enactment task 
employed by Zalla et al. (2010).   The task consisted of a study phase and test phase. During the 
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study phase participants were presented verbal descriptions and videos of 30 actions, 15 of which 
they simply observed being performed and 15 of which they observed being performed and 
performed themselves. Participants were informed that after the study phase they would be asked 
about what they had heard, seen and acted out, but were not explicitly told that their memory for the 
action phrases would be tested. Eight different 30-item lists of actions were used during the task, 
and list presentation was counterbalanced across all participants. Each 30 item-list consisted of 
actions phrases drawn from an overall set of 60 action phrases. Four lists were created using action 
phrases from one half of this set, and another four lists were created using action phrases from the 
other half of this set. Each list presented the action phrases in a different randomised order, and in 
each list 15 actions were randomly selected as the actions assigned to be performed.  All eight lists 
were equated for mean syllable length of items and mean spoken word frequency as indexed by 
Kucera and Francis (1967), all of which were reported in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database 
(Coltheart, 1981). The adequacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant effect of List 
in a multivariate ANOVA (using Wilks’ Lambda criterion) that included syllable length and word 
frequency as the dependent variables, F (14, 464) = 0.31, p = .993,   = .01. 
During the study phase actions were presented to participants on a computer screen which 
participants stood approximately 1.5 meters away from.  Participants were instructed that the 
beginning of each trial would be signalled by the presentation of either a green or red dot at the top 
of the screen.  Both green and red dots were identical in size (2x2cm) and appeared at the top of the 
computer screen for the entirety of a trial. After the dot (either red or green) had been presented for 
1000ms it was followed by a recording of a male voice describing an action phrase (e.g. “pour some 
water”). All voice clips used in the task were 2000ms long. Immediately after auditory presentation 
of the action phrase participants were then presented with a video of an actor performing the 
appropriate action. All video clips were 6000ms long, during which a male actor acted out the 
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appropriate action and then adopted a neutral stance for the remainder of the clip. Figure 1 shows a 
representation of stimuli presentation on each trial of the task.  
Participants were instructed that if a green dot appeared on the screen at the start of a trial 
they should listen to the action and then simultaneously mimic the action described while the video 
was being presented. If a red dot appeared at the start of a trial participants were instructed simply 
to listen to the action phrase and then watch the video clip of the actor performing the phrase. 
During these trials participants were asked to stand in a neutral position. At the end of each trial the 
experimenter clicked the mouse, after which the next trial began immediately. During green dot 
trials the experimenter moved onto the next trial only after the video had been fully presented and 
they had observed the participant adequately perform the appropriate action.  
After a short 5 minute break participants completed the test phase. Firstly participants’ 
memory for the action phrases was tested using a basic recall task in which participants were given 
five minutes to write down as many of the action phrases as they could remember. Secondly 
participants completed a recognition and source memory task. In this task participants were 
presented with 60 action phrases (15 they had performed, 15 they had observed and 30 novel ‘lure’ 
phrases). One of the remaining stimuli lists was used to make up the 30 novel actions phrases, and 
so novel phrases were matched to the ‘old’ action phrases for syllable length and word frequency 
(as stated above). Participants were asked to judge whether each action phrase was ‘old’ (had been 
presented to them previously during the study phase) or ‘new’ (had not been presented in the study 
phase). If participants thought that an action phrase was old they were also asked to decide whether 
they thought the action was one they had performed, or one they had observed being performed but 
not performed themselves. During this task participants were presented individually with each 
action phrase on the computer screen, and an experimenter recorded their responses, and then 
moved onto the next trial.  
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Action monitoring task.  The action monitoring task employed in this study was based on 
the task used in Williams and Happé (2009a). There were two conditions (Self and Other) of the 
task.  In each condition, a series of different coloured squares moved across a computer screen. All 
the squares moved whenever the mouse was moved and froze whenever the mouse was not being 
moved. However, during each trial only one of the squares (the target square) consistently moved in 
accordance with the movements of the mouse. In other words, only the target square was directly 
controlled by the participant.  The remaining squares in each trial (the distractor squares) moved in 
a pseudo-random fashion.  
In both the Self and Other conditions of the task there were a total of 18 levels, which 
increased in difficulty (Table 2 summarises each level of the task). Participants completed five 30s 
trials at each level, and moved onto the next level only if they successfully completed more trials 
than would be expected by chance. For example at level 1 four squares were presented on the 
screen, one of which was the target square and three of which were distractor squares. Across five 
trials, if an individual randomly chose squares, by chance they would be expected to successfully 
identify the target square on one in every four trials. As such, to pass level 1 a participant had to 
successfully identify the target square at least twice (in five trials) to perform above chance on this 
level. The number of distractor squares increased as levels got harder. At level two there were 8 
distractors, at level three there were 15 distractors, at level four there were 24 distractors, at level 
five there were 35 distractors and at level six there were 48 distractors. 
Task difficulty was also manipulated by varying the degree of similarity between the 
movement of the target square and the movements of the distractor squares. The vector movements 
of the distractor squares could be varied between 0° to 360° relative to the target square. If the 
movements of the distractor squares varied by 0° degrees from the target square all the squares 
would move the same, and so the task would be impossible. In contrast, if the movement of the 
distractor squares varied by 360° the distractor squares could move in any direction relative to the 
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movement of the target square. If participants successfully completed levels 1 to 6 with the 
distractor squares set at a movement arc of 360° they moved onto level 7, which was the same as 
level 1 (i.e., one target and three distractor squares), but the movements of the distractor squares 
were contained to an 180° movement arc. Levels 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were the same as levels 2, 3, 4 
5, and 6, respectively, expect that the movements of the distractor squares were also contained to a 
180° arc. If participants completed these levels successfully they moved onto level 13, which again 
was the same as level 1 but with the movements of the distractor squares contained to a 90° arc. 
Again levels 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 were the same as levels 2, 3, 4 5, and 6 respectively, except that 
the movement of the distractor squares was now restricted to 90°. Table 2 summarises each level of 
the task. 
Participants always completed the Self condition of the task first. In this condition 
participants moved the mouse and were instructed to press the spacebar once they thought they had 
identified that target square. Once the spacebar was pressed all squares on the screen froze and did 
not move when the mouse was moved, allowing participants to then click on the square they 
thought was the target square. The next trial began immediately after participants clicked on a 
square. If participants did not press the spacebar within 30s the trial ended and participants moved 
onto the next trial. This was considered an incorrect trial. Before participants completed the 
experimental trials, they were shown a demonstration of the task. The experimenter demonstrated 
two trials at level 1, explaining to the participant ‘I think I know which square I am controlling so I 
am going to press the spacebar. Then I can indicate which square I think I was controlling by 
clicking on it’. Participants then completed two practice trials at level 1 followed by the 
experimental trials.  On all trials the mouse was placed inside a cardboard box, which could be 
reached through openings at both ends of the box. This obscured vision of both the mouse and the 
participant’s hand and was used to ensure that participants did not succeed at the task simply by 
matching their hand movements with the movements of the square on the screen. If participants did 
15 
 
not successfully complete enough trials for their performance to be better than chance at a particular 
level a ‘Game Over’ screen appeared, signalling the end of that condition. 
After completing the Self condition participants then completed the Other condition of the 
task. This condition was identical to the Self condition except that as well as the participant placing 
their hand on the mouse, the experimenter took hold of the mouse from the opposite end and 
gripped the top of the mouse with their index and thumb fingers. This allowed the experimenter to 
control the movements of the mouse. The participant was instructed to allow the experimenter to 
control the movements of the mouse, and not to try and move the mouse themselves. During each 
trial the experimenter continuously moved the mouse, first up and down and then left and right. The 
same mouse movements were standardised across all participants and trials. Once the participant 
thought they had identified the target square they were instructed to press the spacebar. Like before, 
all squares on the screen froze and the participant were then able to control the movements of the 
mouse, and click on the square they thought was the target square. As before, the experimenter 
demonstrated the task and participants then completed two practise trials at level one, before 
beginning the experimental trials.  
 
Scoring 
For the enactment effect memory task participants’ recall performance was calculated as the 
proportion of actions individuals correctly recalled, both for enacted actions and observed actions. 
As a measure of recognition performance two separate corrected hit rates were calculated1. 
Corrected hit rates were calculated using the formula H-FA, where H represents hit rate (the 
proportion of old items participants correctly identifying as ‘old’) and FA represents false alarm 
rate (the proportion of new actions participants incorrectly identifying ‘old’). Two corrected hit rate 
scores were calculated, using separate hit rates for enacted and observed actions.  A single false 
alarm rate was used to calculate both corrected hit rates, since false alarm rates were derived from 
16 
 
performance on distractor items which by definition were neither enacted nor observed. Source 
monitoring performance was calculated as the proportion of action phrases participants made 
correct source attributions for (i.e. correctly identified performed actions as ‘performed’, and 
observed actions as ‘observed’), for both enacted and observed action phrases.   
During both conditions of the action monitoring task the computer automatically recorded 
which squares participants clicked on during each trial, and whether this was the correct target 
square. For each participant the total number of successfully completed trials (from a maximum of 
90 trials) and the total number of successfully completed levels (from a maximum of 18 levels) in 
both the Self and Other condition was calculated.  
 
Results 
 
Enactment Task 
Free Recall. Table 3 shows the average proportion of actions that individuals in the ASD 
and TD group recalled correctly, for both enacted and observed actions. A 2 (Group: ASD/TD) × 2 
(Condition: Enacted/Observed) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of actions correctly 
recalled. A significant main effect of Condition was found, F (1, 32)= 28.42, p < .001,  = .47, 
reflecting the fact that across groups individuals recalled significantly more actions that they had 
performed, compared to actions they had observed. There was no significant main effect of Group, 
F  (1, 32) = 1.31, p = .261,  = .04, and no significant interaction between Group and Condition F 
(1, 32) = .01, p = .906, < .01. This reflected the fact that participants in both groups showed the 
same pattern of performance on the recall task, and recalled significantly more enacted actions than 
observed actions (showing a statistically significant enactment effect).   
Recognition. Corrected hit rates for enacted and observed actions among ASD and 
comparison participants are reported in Table 31.  A 2 (Group: ASD/TD) × 2 (Condition: 
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Enacted/Observed) mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data. A significant main effect of 
Condition was found, F (1, 32) = 58.96, p < .001,  = .65, reflecting superior recognition of enacted 
items than observed items. There was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 32) = 0.004, p = 
.952, < .01, and no significant interaction between Group and condition F (1, 32) = 2.09, p = .158, 
 = .06. This reflected the fact that both groups showed a similar pattern of recognition 
performance, demonstrating better recognition discrimination for enacted actions compared to 
actions they had observed.  
Source Monitoring. Table 3 also shows the average proportion of actions that participants 
in the ASD and TD group made correct source memory judgements for, for both enacted and 
observed actions. A 2 (Group: ASD/TD) × 2 (Condition enacted/observed) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted. A significant main effect of Condition was found, F (1,32) = 25.9, p <.001,  = .45, 
reflecting the fact that, across groups, individuals made more correct source judgements for enacted 
actions compared to actions they had observed. There was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 
32) = 0.04, p = .844, < .01, and no significant interaction between Group and condition F (1, 32) 
= .01, p = .944, < .01. This reflected the fact that both groups made more correct source 
monitoring judgments for enacted actions compared to observed action.  
A series of one sample t-tests was carried out, to establish whether performance on the 
enactment task was at floor or ceiling level, for any of the memory measures. These t-tests indicated 
that, in both the ASD and TD groups, performance on the recall, recognition, and source monitoring 
tasks significantly differed from floor or ceiling level performance, all ts > 2.38, all ps < .030. 
To summarise, on all three tests of memory (recall, recognition, and source monitoring) 
participants in both the ASD and TD groups showed better memory for actions that they had 
enacted compared to actions they had observed. This pattern of memory performance did not differ 
between ASD participants and TD participants on any measure, as indicated by no significant 
interactions between participants’ diagnostic group and their memory for enacted/observed action 
18 
 
 
Squares Task 
Table 4 shows the mean number of levels and trials completed in both the Self and Other 
conditions of the task, for both ASD and TD participants. Firstly a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA was 
carried out, with  the  number of trials completed in each condition (Self/Other) entered as a within-
subjects variable and diagnostic group (ASD/TD) entered as a between subject variable. There was 
a significant main effect of condition on the number of trials completed, F (1, 32) = 75.66, p < .001, 
= .70. This reflected superior performance in the Self condition compared to the Other condition. 
There was no significant main effect of group, F (1, 32) = 0.46, p = .503, = .01, indicating, across 
both conditions, that participants in the ASD group showed similar performance to comparisons 
participants. There was also no significant interaction between group and condition, F (1, 32) = 
1.45, p = .237, = .04.  
Another  2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA was carried out, with the number of levels 
participants successfully completed in each Condition (Self/Other) entered as a within-subjects 
variable, and Group (ASD/TD) entered as a between subjects variable. Again, there was a 
significant main effect of condition on the number of levels successfully completed, F (1, 32) = 
87.23, p < .001, = .73. There was no main effect of Group, F (1, 32) =1.54, p = .223, = .05. 
However, the interaction between Group and Condition was marginally significant, F (1, 32) = 
3.95, p = .056, = .11.  To investigate this interaction further a series of independent sample t-tests 
was carried out. These indicated that within the Self condition there was no significant group 
difference in the number of levels successfully completed, t (32) = 1.67, p = .105, d = 0.57. This 
was also the case in the Other condition, t (32) = 1.63, p = .112, d = 0.56. Paired-samples t-tests 
showed there was a significant difference between the number of levels completed in the Self 
condition, compared to the Other condition, in both the ASD group, t (16) = 4.83, p <.001, d =  
2.87, and the TD group , t (16) = 8.73, p <.001, d = 1.75.  The significant interaction between Group 
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and Condition appeared to be driven by the relatively larger difference between performance on the 
Self and Other conditions of the task shown by ASD participants compared to TD participants. On 
average individual in the TD group completed 7.29 (6.22) more levels on the Self condition of the 
task compared to the Other condition, whereas individuals in the ASD group completed on average 
11.24 (5.31) more levels on the Self condition compared to the Other condition. Figures 2 and 3 
show the number of participants in each group that successfully completed each level of the task, in 
both the Self and Other conditions. 
 
Relations between action monitoring ability on the Enactment task and the Squares task 
On the Squares task, the size of the effect of action monitoring was calculated by subtracting 
the number of successful trials participants made in the Other condition from the number of 
successful trials participants made in the Self condition of the task. This difference score 
represented the size of the advantage of action monitoring on the Squares task. The greater the 
score, the more sensitive action monitoring ability was on the task. 
On the Enactment task, the size of the enactment effect participants showed was calculated 
by subtracting participants’ memory scores for observed actions from their memory scores for 
enacted actions. Three separate difference scores were calculated for 1) recall memory, 2) 
recognition memory and 3), source monitoring memory. For all three scores the greater the score, 
the greater the memory advantage for enacting actions compared to observing them.  
To investigate the relation between the effect of action monitoring on the Squares task and 
extent to which participants showed an enactment effect on the Enactment task, a series of 
Pearson’s correlations was conducted. There was no significant relation between the size of the 
effect of action monitoring (on the Squares task) and the extent to which participants showed 
enactment effects on the recall, recognition and source monitoring tests (on the Enactment task), 
among either ASD or comparison participants, all rs < .28, all ps > .279.  
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Discussion 
Individuals with ASD showed no evidence of action monitoring impairments in this study. 
Results from the Squares task indicated that the ASD group were as able as comparison individuals 
to detect which square was controlled by their own actions. Importantly, both groups of participants 
also found it significantly easier to identify the target square when it was controlled by their own 
intentional movements, compared to when the movement of the target square was controlled by the 
experimenter. Thus, individuals with ASD were able to monitor their own motor commands and 
benefit from the feelings of agency that were unique to the Self condition of the task. Indeed, there 
was some evidence that individuals with ASD were somewhat more sensitive to their agency than 
comparison participants; when the number of successful levels completed on the Squares task was 
taken as the dependent measure of performance. These results are in keeping with previous 
suggestions that individuals with ASD may in fact make more efficient use of non-visual, motor 
cues than typically developing individuals, and rely relatively less on visual cues (Frith & Hermelin, 
1969).  This suggests that, far from being impaired, individuals with ASD might show heightened 
physical self-awareness. Regardless of whether this is the case, the results from this study certainly 
do not suggest that individuals with ASD are impaired at online action monitoring.  
During the enactment task, as predicted, adults with ASD showed better memory for actions 
they had enacted, compared to actions they had observed, on all three memory tests. On the recall, 
recognition, and source monitoring tests, memory performance was both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar in the ASD and TD groups; individuals with ASD showed enactment effects 
of a closely similar magnitude to those shown by typically developing individuals. This is in 
keeping with many previous studies that have reported finding typical enactment effects in 
individuals with ASD (e.g., Hare, Mellor, & Azmi, 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009b; Maras, Memon, 
Lambrechts, & Bowler, 2012; Summers & Craik, 1994; Williams & Happé, 2009a), and also in 
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keeping with many studies in the broader action monitoring literature (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2006; 
David et al., 2008). Indeed, with respect to the recognition and source memory tasks, our results 
replicate those of Zalla et al. (2010); in both our study and in Zalla et al.’s study, typical enactment 
effects for recognition and source memory were observed among individuals with ASD.  
Nonetheless, in their discussion of their data, Zalla et al. mainly focussed on the only difference 
they observed between the groups, which was in free recall only.  It was in this respect we were not 
able to replicate Zalla et al.’s results.    
In the introduction we argued that only two studies (Russell & Jarrold, 1999; Zalla, et al., 
2010) have reported finding that individuals with ASD do not show a typical enactment effect, 
using samples we know are well matched. Russell and Jarrold’s study could not be replicated by 
Williams and Happé (2009a). Similarly, in this paper, the only finding we failed to replicate was 
atypical memory performance in individuals with ASD on the recall test (the only results in the 
paper that in any way indicated action monitoring is impaired in ASD). As such, it is argued that 
this study, and the enactment effect literature in general, provides support for theories that suggest 
action monitoring should remain unimpaired in individuals with ASD (e.g., Lind, 2010; Williams, 
2010).  
A number of studies have now explored whether individuals with ASD demonstrate typical 
enactment effects. A summary of the results from these studies is shown in Table 5. This table 
shows that, in fact, the majority of these studies are in keeping with the results of this study, and 
report similar performance in ASD and comparison participants (with both groups either showing 
an enactment effect of similar magnitude, or both groups showing no enactment effect). Across 
these studies, when you look at the average size of the memory advantage individuals demonstrate 
for self-performed items compared to other-performed items, there is no significant difference 
between ASD and TD participants, t (38) = .40, p = .692, d =0.11.  On average, across all studies 
looking at the enactment effect, ASD participants remembered 10% more actions that they 
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performed compared to actions they observed.  Comparably, on average, TD participants 
remembered 11% more actions when they enacted them. This lends more support to the view that 
action monitoring (and physical self-awareness, more generally) is undiminished in ASD. 
Potential reasons for why both Russell & Jarrold (1999) and Zalla et al., (2010) found 
discrepant results, compared to other studies of the enactment effect in individuals with ASD, 
should be considered. One potential reason for discrepancies between studies could be differences 
in the developmental ability of participants in different studies. It is possible that problems with 
action monitoring may be evident in individuals with ASD who have low verbal mental ages. The 
average verbal mental age (VMA) of the children with ASD in Russell & Jarrold’s study (VMA= 
7.13 years) was lower than the level among children with ASD in Williams & Happé (2009a) study 
(VMA= 8.44 years), potentially explaining why only Williams and Happé observed an enactment 
effect among their sample of ASD participants.  However, the developmental level (i.e., VMA) of 
participants is unlikely to be the sole explanation for differences across studies, because other 
studies have reported a typical enactment effect among children with ASD whose VMAs were on 
average lower than participants in Russell & Jarrold’s study. For example, Lind and Bowler (2009b) 
found that a sample of children with ASD with an average VMA of 6.66 years showed typical 
enactment effects compared to comparison participants. An alternative explanation for Russell and 
Jarrold’s failure to observe an enactment effect among individuals with ASD may be to do with the 
verbal intelligence, rather than developmental level, of participants.  That is, problems with action 
monitoring may be evident only among intellectually low-functioning in individuals with ASD.  In 
Russell and Jarrold’s study, participants with ASD had a mean VIQ of only approximately 53.892, 
which is notably low, relative to other relevant studies.  However, it is also notable that a large 
proportion of the individuals with ASD in Williams and Happé’s sample would still be considered 
relatively intellectually low-functioning (the mean VIQ among participants with ASD was 73.50), 
but nonetheless showed typical enactment effects’.  Moreover, reference to VIQ does not explain 
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why adults in Zalla et al’s study (mean VIQ =114.2) did not show an enactment effect on the recall 
task. As such, developmental differences in VMA/ VIQ cannot fully explain discrepancies between 
each study’s findings.  
Within the literature, three studies (the current study; Williams and  Happé 2009a; Russell & 
Hill, 2001) have now used the Squares task (or a variation of it) to investigate action monitoring 
ability in individuals with ASD.  All three of these studies find convergent results, indicating 
undiminished task performance among adults and children with ASD. That being said, the current 
study did not find a significant correlation between the effect of action monitoring on the Squares 
task and the extent to which participants showed an enactment effect on the action memory task , in 
either the ASD or the TD group. In this respect, we did not replicate Williams and Happé’s findings 
(2009a). The enactment tasks that we used was based as closely as possible on the method used in 
Zalla et al., (2010) and thus was not the same task as the task used by Williams & Happé. As such, 
it may be the case that the enactment task we used in the current study measured distinct aspects of 
action monitoring to that used in Williams and Happé.  Furthermore, this study assessed action 
monitoring ability in adults, whereas Williams & Happé assessed action monitoring ability in 
children. Any of these differences between the study designs/methods could explain the discrepancy 
between the results in terms of this specific finding.  However, in our view, what is more notable is 
the high consistency of findings across these two studies.  Despite the differences in methods used, 
the results from the two studies converge in most respects.   
In terms of the broader literature concerning self-awareness in ASD, the majority of 
evidence (including the results from both tasks in this study) suggests that physical self-awareness 
is undiminished in ASD.  In contrast, studies have indicated that autobiographical (episodic) 
memory (Crane & Goddard, 2008; Crane, Pring, Jukes, & Goddard, 2012), and episodic future 
thinking, is impaired in ASD (e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010;  Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, in 
press), and arguments have been put forward to suggest that such impairments may (partially) result 
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from impairments in self-awareness (see Lind, 2010). However, diminished memory for personally 
experienced events, and the diminished ability to imagine events in the future, is likely to rely on an 
awareness of a psychological, temporally-extended self. Thus, it appears that individuals with ASD 
may demonstrate selective impairments only in psychological self-awareness.  
Theoretically, the results of this study can also inform cognitive theories surrounding the 
sense of agency. Within the literature debate exists concerning how different aspects of social 
cognition, such as agency, imitation and mentalising relate to one and other. Arguably, if a sense of 
agency acts as a precursor to mentalising ability (Russell, 1996), then stereotypical mentalising 
deficits in individuals with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, 
& Solomonica-Levi, 1998) should be associated with similar deficits in action monitoring. Our 
results, alongside results from several other studies (e.g., David, et al., 2008; Hamilton, et al., 2007; 
Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005) suggests that a dissociation may exist between the sense 
of agency and mentalising ability, which is stereotypically impaired in individuals with ASD. 
Instead, our results support suggestions (e.g., David, et al., 2008) that social-cognitive deficits 
associated ASD occur at a higher-level than that needed for a sense of agency.  
As well as having theoretical implications, establishing the extent of action monitoring 
abilities in ASD has practical importance. It is well established that typically developing individuals 
show better memory for information they have enacted. On the basis that individuals with ASD also 
benefit from self-enactment then strategies aimed at improving learning and memory in ASD 
should focus on encouraging approaches that capitalise on this particular memory strength (i.e., 
encouraging motor participation in the learning process). More generally, it may be possible to 
improve everyday functioning in individuals with ASD if memory can be enhanced by physical 
self-enactment. Additionally, establishing whether individuals with ASD show an intact ability to 
accurately determine the source of actions gives rise to potential forensic implications. For example, 
being able to accurately recall an event one was involved in, and distinguish between actions carried 
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out by oneself and others, influences the reliability of eyewitness testimonies (see Maras, et al., 
2012). This study indicates that action monitoring is a relative strength in ASD, something that 
should be taken into account in future research. 
 
 
  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Participant characteristics  
 Group    
 ASD (n = 17) TD (n = 17) t p Cohen’s d 
Age 29.11 (10.55) 29.43 (14.95) 0.07 .944 0.02 
VIQ 113.06 (13.83) 111.00 (10.77) 0.48 .632 0.17 
PIQ 110.71 (15.58) 113.24 (11.20) 0.54 .591 0.19 
FSIQ 114.53 (14.51) 113.59 (10.94) 0.21 .832 0.07 
AQ Total Score 33.71 (9.23) 12.65 (5.22) 8.19 <.001 2.81 
ADOS Total Score* 11.13 (3.58)     
 
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule  
*Based on 15/17 participants 
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Table 2: Stimulus characteristics for each level of the Action Monitoring task. 
 
Level No. of distractor squares 
 
Minimum no. of trials required to 
move onto next level (out of 5) 
Distractor movement arc  (°) 
 
1 3 2 360 
2 8 1 360 
3 15 1 360 
4 24 1 360 
5 35 1 360 
6 48 1 360 
7 3 2 180 
8 8 1 180 
9 15 1 180 
10 24 1 180 
11 35 1 180 
12 48 1 180 
13 3 2 90 
14 8 1 90 
15 15 1 90 
16 24 1 90 
17 35 1 90 
18 48 1 90 
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the procedure used during the study phase of the 
Enactment Task. 
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Table 3: Memory performance on the recall, recognition, and source monitoring tasks for enacted 
and observed action phrases in the ASD and TD groups. 
  Group 
  ASD  TD  
Recall performance Enacted .63 (.13) .62 (.14) 
 Observed .37 (.13) .38 (.14) 
Recognition performance Enacted .95 (.09) .97 (.05) 
 Observed .83 (.14) .81 (.13) 
Source monitoring performance Enacted .95 (.06) .96 (.07) 
 Observed .80 (.20) .81 (.11) 
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 Table 4: Mean (standard deviation) number of levels and trials completed in the Self 
and Other condition, by both the ASD and TD group. 
  Group 
  ASD  TD  
Trials Completed Self 40.59 (20.77) 33.53 (22.43) 
 Other 3.59 (2.98) 5.53 (4.00) 
Levels Completed Self  12.59 (5.42) 9.41 (5.69) 
 Other 1.35 (1.11) 2.12 (1.58) 
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Figure 2: Number of participants in each group who successfully completed each level in the Self 
condition of the action monitoring task.   
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Figure 3: Number of participants in each group who successfully completed each level of the Other 
condition of the action monitoring task. 
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Table 5: Summary of studies reporting memory for self-performed items in individuals with ASD and typically developing comparison participants. This table reports 
the group size for each study, and the average difference in memory performance between the proportion of self-performed items remembered compared to the 
proportion of other-performed items remembered. 
 
 
Memory Test Report a significant difference in the 
size of the enactment effect shown by 
ASD and TD participants 
Proportion change across 
conditions (Self-Other) 
n 
   ASD    TD ASD TD 
Summers & Craik (1994)a Free Recall  No .20 .05 8 8 
 Recognition No .17 .24 8 8 
Farrant, Boucher & Blades (1998) Source memory No -.18 -.06 15 15 
Russell & Jarrold (1999)b Source memory  Yes -.03 .02 22 22 
Millward, Powell, Messer & Jordan (2000)c Recall Yes / / 12 12 
Hill & Russell (2002) Source memory No .06 .01 20 20 
Hala, Rasmussen & Henderson (2005) Source memory No .16 .05 13 13 
Hare, Mellor & Azmi (2007) Free recall No .06 .12 12 14 
 Cued Recall No .17 .23 12 14 
Williams & Happé (2009a)b Source memory No .04 -.01 16 16 
Lind & Bowler (2009b) Recognition No .19 .22 53 50 
 Source memory No .12 .07 53 50 
Zalla, Daprati, Sav, Chaste, Nico & Leboyer 
(2010) 
Free Recall Yes .08 .24 18 18 
Recognition No .10 .14 18 18 
 Source memory No .09 .13 18 18 
Wojcik, Allen, Brown & Souchay (2011) Free Recall Yes .00 .03 16 16 
Maras, Memon, Lambrects & Bowler (2012) Free recall No .25 .20 18 18 
 Cued Recall No .02 .05 18 18 
Grainger, Williams & Lind (current study) Free Recall No .26 .24 17 17 
 Recognition No .12 .16 17 17 
 Source memory No .15 .15 17 17 
  Average across all studies (SD): .10 (.10) .11(.09) 18.46 (11.02) 18.38 (10.15) 
  
Total no. of participants in all studies:   240 239 
a In this study there was no other-performed condition, but instead self-performed items were compared to verbally presented items.  
b For both Russell & Jarrold (1999) and Williams & Happé (2009a) the statistics reported here refer to differences in memory for cards turned over by participants themselves (on behalf of themself and their doll) compared to 
cards turned by another (on behalf of the experimenter and the experimenter’s doll). In the case of Russell & Jarrold (1999) the statistics refer to proportion change across both conditions (expected/unexpected) of the task.  
c Millward et al., (2000) do not report means and standard deviations for their results, making it not possible to calculate effect sizes and proportion differences between the Self and Other condition. 
Footnote 
1 It should be highlighted that Zalla et al., (2010) used the nonparametric measures of    and      to assess participants recognition discrimination. However, when    scores were calculated for 
recognition performance in this study, one sample t-tests indicated that scores did not significantly 
differ from ceiling level accuracy (100% discrimination accuracy) for enacted actions in both in the 
TD group, t (16) = 1.97, p = .06, and ASD group, t (16) = 1.87, p = .08. As such, to maximise the 
rigour of our statistical analysis, corrected hit rates were used as an alternative measure of 
recognition performance on the task.   
2The average VIQ for participants in the ASD group is not reported in Russell and Jarrold 
(1999). However, Russell and Jarrold (1999) reports the average VMA (7.13 years) and the average 
chronological age (CA; 13.23) for participants in the ASD group. These were used to estimate the 
average VIQ of the ASD group, using the formula VIQ = VMA/CA × 100.  
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